A new war in Europe may be closer than you think

ANALYSIS

A housing block in Ukraine hit by a Russian missile. Photo by Emma Strauss.

If there is one thing that I have learned in more than three decades of watching and reporting on conflicts it is that, even when all the warning signs are there, almost no one believes wars will happen until they do.

Whether it is ingrained human optimism, an unwillingness to face up to unpleasant facts, or just that we resort to a logic that doesn’t apply – why on earth would they want to do that? It’s just not in their interest – we get it wrong again and again.

In Sarajevo in 1992, even as tensions soared, a Serb family decided to hold a wedding on 1^st March. It was only when the groom’s father was shot dead by a sniper that they were forced to face up to grim reality. The country was now at war.

In Kyiv, on the eve of war, I talked to many Ukrainians who said that the Russians would never attack. Putin, they believed, was bluffing.

And it’s not just the general population who are at fault. I have watched war catch politicians, armies, and especially the commentariat unprepared time after time.

Western experts lined up in droves to pooh-pooh suggestions Putin might invade Ukraine well into February 2022. I even had a call from a mainstream British publication telling me that they were sure war was not going to happen. When I disagreed, they asked if I could be on standby to write them a piece about the invasion. “Just in case” I was told.

And so it is once again now.

With the US set on a nationalist and perhaps even expansionist path, and Nato on life support, we could be facing a land war between Russia and some of the countries of the European Union within as little as a couple of years.

Until a few months ago such a scenario was almost unimaginable, a prediction that was the preserve of a small grouping of uber-hawks, branded as alarmists and extreme Russophobes by many.

Even when Donald Trump ascended to power most believed that while he might drive a hard bargain from Ukraine – ‘he’s all about the transactional’ we were told again and again – he would ultimately act as a neutral broker, even if he didn’t overtly support Kyiv.

After all, it was assumed, if he wanted to have a Nobel prize on his mantelpiece, it would only be by coming up with a formula that would work for both Moscow and Kyiv that he could silence the big guns and bring about lasting peace.

But such thinking assumes that Trump thinks the way the rest of us think. (Just as in Feb 2022 many maintained, some with great self-assurance, that Putin also thought the way the rest of us thought.) And that has proven to be disastrously misguided.

Far from empowering Nato (‘he’s actually helped us by forcing us to spend more on defence’ is a line that is now wearing a little thin) Trump has hammered a stake into the heart of the alliance.

Allies are even beginning to wonder aloud if the US might turn off or degrade weapon systems that they have purchased from Washington just when they need them.

As well as setting about emasculating Nato, the Trump administration has also bolstered Russia’s prospects of being able to bring down Ukraine.

Trump and his officials have reiterated Moscow’s favourite talking points (even when they are flat-out lies), hinted at the removal of sanctions, promised that Ukraine cannot join Nato, and strongly suggested the Kremlin will get to keep large areas of eastern Ukraine it has seized by force.

This new tone was on full shocking display last week in an interview between Steve Witkoff, Trump’s envoy to Putin, and the right-wing chat show host Tucker Carlson. Witkoff declared that Putin was “super smart”, “straight up”, and “enormously gracious.”

Then, at the end of last week, the US went one step further. It laid out a fresh set of demands for Kyiv to place half the earnings from the country’s mineral, oil and gas wealth into a fund it controls.

A month ago a less onerous set of demands left much of Europe’s leadership reaching for the smelling salts. This time around it barely raised a whimper. I found myself wondering whether the continent’s political elite are adapting, giving up, or merely punch-drunk.

Regardless, by placing his finger firmly on the Russian side of the scales, Trump has set in motion a process that could end in a new war in Europe.

The Kremlin has turned nearly half of all federal expenditure towards creating a formidable fighting force and has an army heading up towards 1.5 million men, many of them blooded on the battlefields of the Donbas.

It is rolling out new tanks, military equipment, and trained men even as I write.

Ironically, for the time being, it is embattled Ukraine that is saving Europe, not the other way round.

Until such a time as Kyiv is defeated – and that time may still be quite a way off if indeed it comes – the Russians will be forced to burn up capability and materiel in the east of that country.

The Ukrainian Army has a total of around 900,000 men. They are tired but highly-motivated, adapting quickly, and right at the cutting edge of modern warfare with its reliance on drones and counter-drone technology.

To put it in perspective the British Army is about 75,000 strong, the French Army around 120,000 and the German Army about 60,000. (These figures are hard to compare because it depends on exactly how and what is measured. But you get the idea.)

There are two ways things can now go.

If Ukraine fights on it will, at least for a while, blunt Russian military capability.

But Trump may decide to bludgeon Kyiv into an unfavourable ceasefire. Washington, after all, has a lot of leverage.

Ukraine is still receiving US weapons deliveries, commercial satellite mapping and the essential Starlink communication services.

If that happens Moscow can then redeploy its troops - perhaps up to 300,000 of the 600,000 currently in Ukraine - to points west and north.

Suddenly, the Baltic states, backed up only by a small British contingent in Estonia, a German contingent in Lithuania, and a Canada-led multinational force in Latvia, would be staring east at a very large Russian Army.

Military experts have been quoted as saying that as long as the war in Ukraine continues, Europe probably has about five to seven years to prepare for a further Russian push.

But if there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, and President Putin decides he is in a rush, that could drop to two or less.

An indication of how much trouble lies ahead on Europe’s eastern fringes will be the mood music around a large Russian military exercise this autumn in its north-west named Zapad.

The Baltics, in particular, will be watching very carefully.

“We all understand that when the war in Ukraine will be stopped, Russia will redistribute its forces very quickly,” Estonian defence minister Hanno Pevkur told the Financial Times. “That means also the threat level will increase significantly very quickly.”

His Lithuanian counterpart, Dovilė Sakalienė, said: “Let’s not have any illusions. Let’s not lie to ourselves that Russia is going to be done after Ukraine. Russia will use this time following a ceasefire to speed up its military capabilities. They already have a huge, battlefield-trained army, which is going to get even bigger.”

I asked an Estonian friend last week what he thought. He said Estonians weren’t talking about it much, but war with Russia was on everyone’s mind.

“A few who can afford it are looking for a place in Spain or Italy,” he said. “Of course they say it is just to go on holiday. But we know what it really means.”